Introduction
Uncovering monetary policy is hard. While the instruments of policy, such as the federal funds rate or reserve requirements, are directly observed, the process that led to their choice is not. Instead, we have the documentary record of the minutes of di¤erent meetings, the memoirs of participants in the process, and internal memos circulated inside the Federal Reserve System.
Although this paper trail is valuable, it is not and cannot be a complete record of the policy process. First and foremost, documents are not a perfect photograph of reality. For example, participants at FOMC meetings do not say or vote what they really would like to say or vote, but what they think is appropriate at the moment given their objectives and their assessment of the strategic interactions among the members of the committee (the literatures on cheap talk and on strategic voting are precisely based on those insights). Also, memoirs are often incomplete or faulty and sta¤ memos are the product of negotiations and compromises among several actors. Second, even the most complete documentary evidence cannot capture the full richness of a policy decision process in a modern society. Even if it could, it would probably be impossible for any economist or historian to digest the whole archival record. 1 Third, even if we could forget for a minute about the limits of the documents, we would face the fact that actual decisions tell us only about what was done, but say little about what would have been done in other circumstances. And while the absence of an explicit counterfactual may be a minor problem for historians, it is a deep ‡aw for economists who are interested in evaluating whole policy rules and on making recommendations regarding the response to future events that may be very di¤erent from past experiences.
Therefore, in this paper we investigate the history of monetary policy in the U.S. from 1959 to 2007 from a di¤erent perspective. We will build and estimate a rich dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the U.S. economy with both stochastic volatility and parameter drifting in the Taylor rule that determines monetary policy. Then, we will use the results of our estimation to examine, through the lens of the model, the recent monetary policy history of the U.S. Most of our attention will be focused on understanding two fundamental observations: the rise and fall of the great in ‡ation from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the only signi…cant peacetime in ‡ation in U.S. history, and the great moderation of business cycle 1 For instance, Allan Meltzer, in his monumental "A History of the Federal Reserve," uses the summaries of the minutes of FOMC meetings compiled by nine research assistants (page X, volume 2, book 1). This shows how even a several-decades-long commitment to getting acquainted with the archives is not enough to process all the relevant information. Instead, it is necessary to rely on summaries, with all the potential biases and distortions that they might bring. This is, of course, not a criticism of Meltzer: he just proceeded, as many other great historians do, by standing on the shoulders of others. Otherwise, modern archival research would be plainly impossible. ‡uctuations that the U.S. economy experienced between 1984 and 2007, as documented by Kim and Nelson (1998) , McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000) , and Stock and Watson (2002) .
All the di¤erent elements in our exercise are necessary. We need a DSGE model because we are interested in counterfactuals. Thus, we require a model that is structural in the sense of Hurwicz (1962) , that is, invariant to interventions such as the ones that we consider. We need a model with stochastic volatility because, otherwise, any changes in the variance of aggregate variables would be interpreted as the consequence of variations in monetary policy.
The evidence in Sims and Zha (2006) , Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007), and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) points out that these changes in volatility are …rst-order considerations when we explore the data. We need a model with parameter drifting in the monetary policy rule because we want to introduce changes in policy that obey a fully speci…ed probability distribution, and not a "once and for all" change around 1979-1980, as is often Besides using our estimation to interpret the recent monetary policy history of the U.S., we will follow Sims and Zha's (2006) call to connect estimated changes to historical events (we are also inspired by . In particular, we will discuss how our estimation results relate both to the observations about the economy (for instance, how is our model interpreting the e¤ects of oil shocks?) and to the written record.
Our main …ndings are that, while there is strong evidence of changes in monetary policy during Volcker's tenure at the Fed, those changes contributed little to the great moderation.
Instead, changes in the volatility of structural shocks account for most of it. Also, while we …nd that monetary policy was di¤erent under Volcker, there is no much evidence of a di¤erence in monetary policy among Burns, Miller, and Greenspan. The reduction in the volatility of aggregate variables after 1984 is attributed to the time-varying volatility of shocks. The history for in ‡ation is more subtle. According to our estimated model, a more aggressive stance of monetary policy would have reduced in ‡ation in the 1970s, but not completely eliminated it. In addition, we …nd that volatile shocks (especially those related to aggregate demand) were important contributors of the great American in ‡ation.
Most of the material in this paper is based on a much more extensive and detailed work, Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2010), FGR hereafter, in which we present the DSGE model in all of its detail, we characterize the decision rules of the agents, we build the likelihood function, and we estimate the model. Here, we will concentrate instead on understanding recent U.S. monetary history through the lens of our theory. Let us start, then, by introducing our model.
A DSGE Model of the U.S. Economy with Stochastic Volatility and Parameter Drifting
As we argued in the introduction, we need a structural equilibrium model of the economy to evaluate the importance of each of the di¤erent mechanisms behind the evolution of in ‡ation and aggregate volatility in the U.S. over the past several decades.
However, while the previous statement is transparent, it is much less clear how to decide which particular elements of the model we wish to include. On the one hand, we want a model that is su¢ ciently detailed to account for the dynamics of the data reasonably well.
But this goal con ‡icts with the objective of having a parsimonious and soundly microfounded description of the aggregate economy.
Given our investigation, a default choice for a model is a standard DSGE economy with nominal rigidities, such as the ones in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2003) . This class of models is currently being used to inform policy in many central banks, and it is a framework that has proven to be successful at capturing the dynamics of the data. But we will not limit ourselves to using a standard DSGE model. Instead, we will extend it in what we think are important and promising directions by incorporating stochastic volatility into the structural shocks and parameter drifting in the Taylor rule that governs monetary policy.
Unfortunately, for our purposes, the model has two weak points that we must recognize before proceeding further: money and Calvo pricing. Most DSGE models introduce a demand for money through money in the utility function (MIA) or cash in advance (CIA). By doing so, we endow money with a special function without a sound justi…cation. This hides inconsistencies that are di¢ cult to reconcile with standard economic theory (Wallace, 2001 ).
Moreover, the relation between structures where money is essential and the reduced forms embodied by MIA or CIA is not clear. This means that we do not know whether that relation is invariant to changes in monetary policy or to the stochastic properties of the shocks that hit the economy such as the ones we study. This is nothing more than the Lucas critique dressed in a di¤erent way.
The second weakness is Calvo pricing. Probably the best way to think about Calvo pricing is as a convenient reduced form of a more complicated pricing mechanism that is easier to handle, thanks to its memoriless properties. However, if we are entertaining the idea that monetary policy or the volatility of shocks has changed over time, it is exceedingly di¢ cult to believe that the parameters that control Calvo pricing have been invariant over the same period (see the empirical evidence that backs up this argument in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2008).
However, getting around these two limitations seems, at the moment, infeasible. Microfounded models of money are either too di¢ cult to work with (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989) , rest in assumptions nearly as implausible as MIA (Lagos and Wright, 2005) , or that the data …nd too stringent (Aruoba and Schorfheide, 2010) . State-dependent models of pricing are too cumbersome computationally for estimation (Dotsey, King, and Wolman, 1999) . So, with a certain reluctance, we will use a mainstream DSGE model with households, …rms (a "labor packer,"a …nal good producer, and a continuum of intermediate good producers), a monetary authority, the Federal Reserve, which implements monetary policy through open market operations following a Taylor rule; and nominal rigidities in the form of Calvo pricing with partial indexation.
Households
We begin our discussion of the model with households. We will work with a continuum of them, indexed by j. Households are di¤erent because each supplies a speci…c type of labor in the market: some households are carpenters and some households are economists. If, in addition, each household has some market power over its own wage and it stands ready to supply any amount of labor at posted prices, it is relatively easy to introduce nominal rigidities in wages. Some households will be able to change their wages, and some will not, and the relative demand for each type of labor will adjust to compensate for those di¤erences in input prices.
At the same time, we do not want to have a complicated model with heterogeneous agents that is daunting to compute. We resort to two "tricks" to get around that problem.
First, we have a utility function that is separable between consumption, c jt , real money balances, m jt =p t ; and hours worked, l jt . Second, we will have complete markets in Arrow securities. Complete markets allow us to equate the marginal utilities of consumption across all households in all states of nature. And, since by separability this marginal utility depends only on consumption, all households will consume the same amount of the …nal good. The result makes aggregation trivial. Of course, it also has the unpleasant feature that those households that do not update their wages will work di¤erent hours than those who do. If, for example, we have an increase in the average wage, those households stuck with the old, lower wages will work longer hours and will have lower total utility. This is the price we need to pay for tractability.
Given our previous choice of a separable utility function and our desire to have a balanced growth path for the economy (which requires a marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption that is linear in consumption), we postulate a utility function of the form:
where E 0 is the conditional expectation operator, is the discount factor for one quarter (the time period for our model), h controls habit persistence, and # is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. In addition, we introduce two shifters to preferences, common to all households. First, a shifter to intertemporal preference d t that makes utility today more or less desirable. This is a simple device to capture shocks to aggregate demand. A prototypical example could be increases in aggregate demand caused by …scal policy, a whole aspect of reality that we ignore in the model. Other possibility is to think about d t as the consequence of demographic shocks that propagate over time. Second, we will have a shifter to labor supply, ' t . As emphasized by Hall (1997) , this shock is crucial to capture the ‡uctuation of hours in the data.
A simple way to parameterize the evolution of the two shifters is to assume AR (1) processes:
and:
The most interesting feature of these processes is that the standard deviations, dt and 't , of the innovations, " dt and " 't , evolve over time. This is the …rst place where we will introduce time-varying volatility in the model: sometimes the preference shifters are highly volatility, sometimes they are less so. This changing volatility may re ‡ect, for instance, the di¤erent regimes of …scal policy or the consequences of demographic forces (Jaimovich and Siu, 2009 ).
We can specify many di¤erent processes for dt and 't . A simple procedure will be to assume that dt and 't follow a Markov chain and take a …nite number of values. While this speci…cation seems straightforward, it is actually quite involved. The distribution that it implies for dt and 't is discrete and, therefore, perturbation methods (such as the ones that we will use later on) are ill-designed to deal with it. This would force us to rely on global solution methods that are too slow for estimation.
Instead, we can postulate simple AR(1) processes in logs (to ensure the positivity of the standard deviations):
and
This speci…cation is both parsimonious (with only four new parameters,   d , ' , d , and ' ) and rather ‡exible. Because of these advantages, we will impose the same speci…cation for the other three time-varying standard deviations in the model that will appear below (the ones a¤ecting an investment-speci…c technological shock, a neutral technology shock, and a monetary policy shock). Also, here and in the rest of the paper, agents perfectly observe the structural shocks, and the level and innovation to the standard deviations and have rational expectations about their stochastic properties.
Households keep a rich portfolio: they own (physical) capital k jt , nominal government bonds b jt that pay a gross return R t 1 , Arrow securities a jt+1 ; which pay one unit of consumption in event ! jt+1;t , traded at time t at unitary price q jt+1;t , and cash.
The evolution of capital deserves some description. Given a depreciation rate , the amount of capital owned by household j at the end of period t is
Investment, x jt , gets multiplied by a term that depends on a quadratic adjustment cost
written in deviations with respect to the balanced growth rate of investment, x , with adjustment parameter , and an investment-speci…c technology level t . This technology level evolves as a random walk in logs:
with drift and innovation " t , whose standard deviation t evolves according to our favorite autoregressive process:
log t = 1 log + log t 1 + u t where u t N (0; 1):
We introduce this shock convinced by the evidence in Greenwood, Herkowitz, and Krusell (1997) that this is a key mechanism to understanding aggregate ‡uctuations in the U.S. over the last 50 years.
Thus, the j th household's budget constraint is:
where w jt is the real wage, r t the real rental price of capital, u jt > 0 the rate of use of capital,
] is the cost of using capital at rate u jt in terms of the …nal good, t is an investment-speci…c technology level, T t is a lump-sum transfer, and z t is the pro…ts of the …rms in the economy. We postulate a simple quadratic form for [ ]:
and normalize u, the utilization rate in the balanced growth path of the economy, to 1. This imposes the restriction that the parameter 1 must satisfy
where e r is the balanced growth path rental price of capital (rescaled by technological progress, as we will explain later).
Of all the choice variables of the households, the only one that requires special attention is hours. As we explained above, each household j supplies their own speci…c type of labor. This labor is aggregated by a "labor packer" into homogenous labor l d t according to a constantelasticity of substitution technology
The "labor packer" is perfectly competitive and takes all the individual wages w jt and the wage w t for l d t as given. The household decides, given the demand function for its type of labor generated by the "labor packer,"
which wage maximizes its utility and stands ready to supply any amount of labor at that wage. However, when it chooses the wage, the household is subject to a nominal rigidity: a Calvo pricing mechanism with partial indexation. At the start of every quarter, a fraction 1 w of households are randomly selected and allowed to reoptimize their wages. All the rest can only index their wages given past in ‡ation with an indexation parameter w 2 [0; 1].
Firms
Besides the "labor packer,"we have two other types of …rms in this economy. First, the …nal good producer, a perfectly competitive …rm that just aggregates a continuum of intermediate goods with the technology:
This …rm takes as given all intermediate goods prices p ti and the …nal good price p t and generates a demand function for each intermediate good:
Second, we have the intermediate good producers. Each of these has access to a CobbDouglas production function:
where k it 1 is the capital and l d it is the "packed"labor rented by the …rm, and A t (our fourth structural shock) is the neutral productivity level, which evolves as a random walk in logs:
with drift A and innovation " At . We keep the same speci…cation for the standard deviation of this innovation as we did for all previous volatilities:
The quantity sold of the good is determined by the demand function (3). Given (3), the intermediate good producers set prices to maximize pro…ts. As was the case for households, 
The Policy Rule of the Federal Reserve
In our model, the Federal Reserve implements monetary policy through open market operations (that generate lump-sum transfers T t to keep a balanced budget). In doing so, the Fed follows a modi…ed Taylor rule that targets the ratio of nominal gross return R t of government bonds over the balanced growth path gross return R:
This rule depends on (1) the past R t 1 , which smooths changes over time; (2) the "in ‡ation gap," t = , where is the balanced growth path of in ‡ation; 2 (3) the "growth gap": the ratio between the growth rate of the economy y t =y t 1 and y , the balanced path gross growth rate of y t , dictated by the drifts of neutral and investment-speci…c technological change; and (4) a monetary policy shock t = exp m;t"mt , with an innovation " mt N (0; 1) and standard deviation of the innovation, m;t , that evolves as:
Note that, since we are dealing with a general equilibrium model, once the Fed has chosen a value of , R is not a free target, as it is determined by technology, preferences, and .
We introduce monetary policy changes through a parameter drift over the responses of R t to the in ‡ation, ;t , and growth gaps, y;t :
log t = 1 log + log t 1 + " t where " t N (0; 1) and log yt = 1 y log y + y log yt 1 + y " yt where " yt N (0; 1):
In preliminary estimations, we discovered that, while other parameters, such as R , could also be changing, the likelihood of the model did not seem to care much about that possibility, and thus, we eliminated those channels.
Our parameter drifting speci…cation tries to capture mainly two di¤erent phenomena. that the long-run growth rate of the U.S. economy had risen.
While this second channel seems well described by a continuous drift in the parameters (beliefs plausibly evolving slowly), changes in the voting members, in particular the chairman, might potentially be better understood as discrete jumps in ;t and y;t . In fact, our smoothed path of ;t , which we will estimate from the data, gives some support to this view. But, in addition to our pragmatic consideration that computing models with discrete jumps is hard, we will argue in Section 6 that, historically, changes have occurred more slowly and even new chairmen have required some time before taking a decisive lead 0n the FOMC (Goodfriend and King, 2007) .
In Section 7, we will talk about other objections to our form of parameter drifting, in particular to the assumption that agents observe the changes in parameters without problem, its exogeneity, or its avoidance of open-economy considerations.
Aggregation and Equilibrium
The model is closed by …nding an expression for aggregate demand
and another for aggregate supply:
According to Walter Heller, president Kennedy clearly stated, "About the only power I have over the Federal Reserve is the power of appointment, and I want to use it" (cited by Bremner, 2004 , page 160). The slowly changing composition of the Board of Governors may lead to situations, such as the one in February 1986 that we will discuss below, when Volcker was outvoted by Reagan's appointees on the Board. 4 The MPS (MIT-Penn-Federal Reserve System) model is the high-water mark of traditional Keynesian macroeconometric models in the Cowles tradition. The MPS model was operationally employed by sta¤ economists at the Fed from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s (see Brayton et al., 1997) .
where:
is the aggregate loss of labor input induced by wage dispersion and The de…nition of equilibrium for this model is rather standard and it is just the path of aggregate quantities and prices that maximize the problems of households and …rms, the government follows its Taylor rule, and markets clear. But while the de…nition of equilibrium is straightforward, its computation is not. We now move into it.
Solution and Likelihood Evaluation
The solution of our model is challenging. We have 19 state variables, 5 innovations to the structural shocks, (" dt ; " 't ; " At ; " t ; " mt ), 2 innovations to the parameter drifts, (" t ; " yt ), and 5 innovations to the volatility shocks, (u dt ; u 't ; u t ; u At ; u mt ), for a total of 31 variables that we must consider.
A vector of 19 states makes it impossible to use value function iteration or projection methods (…nite elements or Chebyshev polynomials). The curse of dimensionality is too acute even for the most powerful of existing computers. Standard linearization techniques do not work either: stochastic volatility is inherently a non-linear process. If we solved the model by linearization, all terms associated with stochastic volatility would disappear, due to certainty equivalence, and our investigation would be essentially worthless.
Then, nearly by default, using perturbation to obtain a higher-order approximation to the equilibrium dynamics of our model is the only option. A second-order approximation will include terms that depend on the level of volatility. Thus, these terms will capture the responses of agents (households and …rms) to changes in volatility. At the same time, a second-order approximation can be found su¢ ciently fast, which is of the utmost importance, since we want to estimate the model and that forces us to solve it again and again for many di¤erent parameter values. Thus, a second-order approximation is an interesting compromise between accuracy and speed.
The idea of perturbation is simple. Instead of the exact decision rule of the agents in the model, we use a second-order Taylor expansion to it around the steady state. That Taylor expansion depends on the state variables and on the innovations. However, we do not know the coe¢ cients multiplying each term of the expansion. Fortunately, we can …nd them by an application of the implicit function theorem as follows (see also Judd, 1998 , and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2005).
First, we write all the equations describing the equilibrium of the model (optimality conditions for the agents, budget and resource constraints, the Taylor rule, and the laws of motion for the di¤erent stochastic processes). Second, we rescale all the variables to remove the balanced growth path induced by the presence of the drifts in the evolution of technology (neutral and investment-speci…c). Third, we …nd the steady state implied by the rescaled variables. Fourth, we linearize the equilibrium conditions around the steady state found in the previous step. Then, we solve for the unknown coe¢ cients in this linearization, which happens to be, by the implicit function theorem, the coe¢ cients of the …rst-order terms of the decision rules in the rescaled variables that we are looking for (which can be easily re-arranged to deliver the decision rules in the original variables). The next step is to take a second-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions, plugging in the terms found before, and solve for the coe¢ cients of the second-order terms of the decision rules.
While we could keep iterating in this procedure for as long as we want, Aruoba, Fernández-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramírez (2006) show that, for the basic stochastic neoclassical growth model (the backbone of the model we have here) calibrated to the U.S. data, a secondorder approximation delivers excellent accuracy at great computational speed. In our actual computation, we undertake the symbolic derivatives of the equilibrium conditions using Mathematica 6.0. The code generates all of the relevant expressions and exports them automatically into Fortran …les. Then, Fortran will send particular parameter values in each step of the estimation, evaluate those expressions, and determine the terms of the Taylor expansions that we need.
Once we have the approximated solution to the model, given some parameter values, we use it to build a state space representation of the dynamics of states and observables. This representation is, as we argued before, non-linear and hence standard techniques such as the Kalman …lter cannot be applied to evaluate the associated likelihood function. Instead, we resort to a simulation method known as the particle …lter, as applied to DSGE models by Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007). The particle …lter generates a simulation of di¤erent states of the model and evaluates the probability of the innovations that make these simulated states explain the observables. These probabilities are also called weights.
A simple application of a law of large numbers tells us that the mean of the weights is an evaluation of the likelihood. The secret of the success of the procedure is that, instead of doing the simulation over the whole sample, we only perform it period by period, resampling from the set of simulated state variables according to the weights we just found. This sequential structure, which makes the particle …lter a case of a more general class of algorithms called sequential Monte Carlo, ensures that the simulation of the state variables remains centered on the true but unknown value of the state variables. This dramatically limits the numerical variance of the procedure. Now that we have an evaluation of the likelihood of the model given observables, we only need to search over di¤erent parameter values according to our favorite estimation algorithm.
This can be done in two ways. One is with a regular maximum likelihood algorithm: we look for a global maximum of the likelihood. This procedure is complicated by the fact that the evaluation of the likelihood function that we get from the particle …lter is non-di¤erentiable with respect to the parameters because the inherent discreteness of the resampling step.
An easier alternative, and one that allows the introduction of presample information, is to follow a Bayesian approach. In this route, we specify a prior over the parameters, multiply the likelihood by it, and sample from the resulting posterior by means of a random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. In this paper, we choose this second route. In our estimation, however, we do not take full advantage of presample information since we impose ‡at priors to facilitate the communication of the results to other researchers: the shape of our posteriors will be proportional to the likelihood. We must note, however, that relying on ‡at priors forces us to calibrate some parameters to values typically used in the literature (see FGR for the values and justi…cation of the calibrated values).
While our description of the solution and estimation method has been necessarily brief, the reader is invited to check FGR for additional details. In particular, FGR characterizes the structure of the higher-order approximations, showing that many of the relevant terms are zero, and exploiting this result to quickly solve for the innovations that explain the observables given some states. This result, proved for a general class of DSGE models with stochastic volatility, is bound to be of wide application in all cases where stochastic volatility is an important aspect of the problem.
Estimation
To estimate our model, we use …ve time series for the U.S. economy: 1) the relative price of investment goods with respect to the price of consumption goods, 2) the federal funds rate, 3) real output per capita growth, 4) the consumer price index, and 5) real wages per capita.
Our sample covers from 1959.Q1 to 2007.Q1.
In …gure 1, we plot three of those …ve series: in ‡ation, (per capita) output growth, and the federal funds rate. The three series are the most commonly discussed when commentators talk about monetary policy. By refreshing our memory about their evolution in the sample, we can frame the rest of our discussion. To ease reading of the series, each of the vertical bars corresponds to the tenure of one chairman of the Fed after Martin (column without color):
Burns-Miller (we merge these last two because of Miller's short tenure), Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke. The point estimates we get from our posterior agree with other estimates in the literature.
For example, we document a fair amount of nominal rigidities in the economy. In any case, we refer the reader to FGR and avoid a lengthy discussion of them. Here, we report only the modes and standard deviations of the posterior distributions associated with the parameters governing stochastic volatility (table 1) and policy (table 2). In our view, those parameters are the most relevant for our reading of the recent history of monetary policy in the U.S. (Woodford, 2003) . 5 The size of the innovations to the drifting in ‡ation parameter, , rea¢ rms our view of a time-dependent response to in ‡ation in monetary policy. The estimates for y;t (the response to output deviations in the Taylor rule) are not reported because preliminary attempts at estimation convinced us that y was nil. Hence, in our next exercises, we set y and y to zero.
Two Graphs
In this section, we present two graphs that will tell us much about the evolution and e¤ects of monetary policy. First, the estimated smoothed path of t over our sample. Second, the evolution during the same years of a measure of the real interest rate. In the next section, we will map these graphs into the historical record.
We start with …gure 2, perhaps the most important graph in this paper. In it, we plot the smoothed estimate of the evolution of the response of monetary policy to in ‡ation plus/minus a two-standard-deviation interval given our point estimates of the structural parameters. The message of …gure 2 is straightforward. According to our model, the response of monetary policy to in ‡ation was, at the arrival of the Kennedy administration, around its estimated mean, slightly over 1. In this …gure we can see that Martin kept the real interest rate at positive values around 2 percent during the 1960s (with a peak by the end, which corresponds with the peak of our estimated t ). However, during the 1970s, the real interest rate was often negative and only rarely above 2 percent, a rather conservative lower bound on the balanced growth real interest rate given our point estimates. The likelihood can only interpret those observations as a very low t (remember that the Taylor principle calls for increases in the real interest rate when in ‡ation rises; that is, nominal interest rates must grow more than in ‡ation). Real interest 7 Since in ‡ation is nearly a random walk (Stock and Watson, 2007) , its current value is an excellent proxy for its expected value. In any case, our argument is fully robust to slightly di¤erent de…nitions of the real interest rate.
rates skyrocketed with the arrival of Volcker, reaching a historical record of 13 percent by 1981.Q2. After that date, they were never even close to zero, and only in two quarters where they below 3 percent. Again, the likelihood function can only interpret that observation as a high t . The history with Greenspan is more complicated, since real interest rates were not particularly low in the 1990s. However, output growth was very positive, which pushed the interest rates up in the Taylor rule. Since the federal funds rate was not as high as the policy rule would have predicted with a high t , the smoothed estimate of the parameter is lowered. During the 2000s, real interest rates close to zero are enough, by themselves, to keep t low.
Reading Monetary History Through the Lens of Our Model
Now that we have our model and our estimates of the structural parameters, we can smooth the structural and volatility shocks implied by the data and use them to read the recent monetary history of the U.S. Somewhat conventionally, we will organize our discussion around the di¤erent chairmen of the Fed from Martin to Greenspan, except for Miller, whom we group with Burns due to his short tenure.
One fundamental lesson from this exercise is that …gure 2 can successfully guide our interpretation of policy from 1959 to 2007. We will document how both Martin and Volcker believed that in ‡ation was dangerous and that the Fed had both the responsibility and the power to …ght it, although growing doubts about that power overcame Martin during his last term as chairman. Burns, on the other hand, thought the costs of in ‡ation were lower than the cost of a recession triggered by disin ‡ation. In any case, he was rather skeptical about the Fed's ability to successfully disin ‡ate. Greenspan, despite his constant warnings about in ‡ation, had in practice a much more nuanced attitude. According to our estimated model, good positive shocks to the economy gave him the privilege of skipping a daunting test of his resolve.
Thanks to the fact that by using a DSGE model we have a complete set of structural and volatility shocks, in FGR, we complete this analysis with the construction of counterfactual exercises. In those, we build arti…cial histories of economies in which some source of variation has been eliminated or modi…ed in an illustrative manner. For example, we can evaluate how the economy would have behaved in the absence of changes in the volatility of the structural shocks or if the average monetary policy of one period had been applied in another one. By interpreting those counterfactual histories, we will attribute it most of the defeat of the great American in ‡ation to monetary policy under Volcker and most of the great moderation after 1984 to good shocks. We will incorporate information from those counterfactuals as we move along.
Our exercise in this section is closely related to the work of Christina and David Romer (1989, 2002a and 2002b, and 2004) , except that we attack the problem from exactly the opposite perspective. While they let their "narrative approach"guide their empirical speci…cation and they like to keep a ‡exible relation with equilibrium models, we start from a tightly parameterized DSGE model of the U.S. economy and use the results of our estimation to read the narrative told by the documents. We see both strategies as complementary since each can teach us much of interest. Quite remarkably, given the di¤erent research designs, many of the conclusions that we reach are similar to the views expressed by Romer and Romer. Bremner starts his biography of Martin with this story. 8 The choice is most appropriate. The history of this confrontation illustrates better than any other event our econometric results.
The early 1960s were the high years of Martin's tenure. The era of the "new economics" combined robust economic growth, in excess of 5 percent, and low in ‡ation, below 3 percent.
According to our estimated model, this moderate in ‡ation was, in part, a re ‡ection of Martin's views about economic policy. Bremner (2004, p. 121) summarizes Martin's guiding principles this way: stable prices were crucial for the correct working of a market economy and the Fed's main task was to maintain that stability. In Martin's own words, the Fed "has a responsibility to use the powers it possesses over economic events to dampen excesses in economic activity
[by] keeping the use of credit in line with resources available for production of goods and services." 9 Martin was also opposed to the idea (popular at the time) that the U.S. economy had a built-in bias toward in ‡ation, a bias the Fed had to accommodate through monetary policy. Sumner Slichter, an in ‡uential professor of economics at Harvard, was perhaps the most vocal proponent of the built-in bias hypothesis. In Martin's own words, "I refuse to raise the ‡ag of defeatism in the battle of in ‡ation" and " [t] here is no validity whatever in the idea that any in ‡ation, once accepted, can be con…ned to moderate proportions." 10 As we will see in the next subsection, this opposition stands in stark contrast to Burns's pessimistic view of in ‡ation, which had many points of contact with Slichter's.
Our estimates of ;t , above 1 and growing during the period, clearly tell us that Martin was doing precisely that: working to keep in ‡ation low. Our result also agrees with Romer The pressures on monetary policy were contained during Kennedy's administration, in 123. 10 The …rst quotation is from the New York Times, March 16, 1957 , where Martin was expressing dismay for having reached a 2 percent rate of in ‡ation! The second quotation is from the Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1957 . Martin also thought that Keynes himself had changed his views on in ‡ation after the war (they had talked privately on several occasions) and that, consequently, Keynesian economists were overemphasizing the bene…ts of in ‡ation. See Bremner (2004), pp. 128 and 229. 11 The message of the paper is, however, much more subtle than laying down a simple textbook Phillips curve. As Samuelson and Solow also say in the next page of the article: "All of our discussion has been phrased in short-run terms, dealing with what might happen in the next few years. It would be wrong, though, to think that our Figure 2 menu that relates obtainable price and unemployment behavior will maintain its shape in the longer run. What we do in a policy way during the next few years might cause it to shift in a de…nite way." But by the summer of 1968, Martin gave in to an easing of monetary policy after the tax surcharge was passed by Congress. As reported by Hetzel (2008) , at the time the FOMC was divided between members more concerned about in ‡ation (such as Al Hayes, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and members more concerned about output growth (Brimmer, 13 Maisel, 14 and Mitchell, all three appointees of Kennedy and Johnson) with Mar- 12 In particular, Dillon's support for Martin's reappointment for a new term in 1963 was pivotal. Hetzel (2008) p. 69, suggests that Kennedy often sided with Dillon and Martin over Heller to avoid a gold crisis on top of the problems with the Soviet Union over Cuba and Berlin. 13 Brimmer is also the …rst African American to have served as governor and, for a while, a faculty member at the University of Pennsylvania.
14 Sherman Maisel was a member of Board of Governors between 1965 and 1972. Maisel, a professor at the Haas School of Business-UC Berkeley, has the honor of being the …rst academic economist appointed as a governor after Adolph Miller, one of the original governors in 1914. As he explained in his book, Managing the Dollar, one of the …rst inside looks at the Fed and still a fascinating read today, Maisel was also a strong believer in the Phillips curve: "There is a trade-o¤ between idle men and a more stable value of the dollar. A conscious decision must be made as to how much unemployment and loss of output is acceptable in order tin, always a seeker of consensus, growlingly incapable of carrying the day. 15 Perhaps Martin felt that the political climate had moved away from a commitment to …ght in ‡ation. 16 Our smoothed estimate of ;t in …gure 2 responds to this behavior of the Fed by quickly dropping during the same period. This re ‡ects that the actual reduction on the federal funds rate was much more aggressive than the reduction suggested by the (important) fall in output growth and the (moderate) fall in in ‡ation. Furthermore, the likelihood accounts for the persistence fall in the real interest rate with a persistent fall in ;t .
to get smaller price rises" (Maisel, 1973, p.285 ). Maisel's academic and Keynesian background merged in his sponsoring of the MPS model that we mentioned in section 2. 15 On one occasion, Maisel felt strongly enough to call a press conference to explain his dissenting vote in favor of more expansion. 16 Meltzer ( 18 Thus, our estimated ;t remains low during that time. 19 Burns was subject to strong pressure from Nixon. 20 His margin of maneuver was also limited by the views among many leading economists that overestimated the costs of disin ‡ation 17 Revealing of the climate of the time is the memorandum prepared by two of Carter's advisers at the end of December 1977 proposing not to reappoint Burns for a third term as chairman because he was "more concerned with in ‡ation than unemployment" (memo for the president on the Role of the Federal Reserve, Box 16, R.K. Lipshitz Files, Carter Library, December 10, 1977, 1-2, cited by Meltzer, 2010, p. 922). 18 "Our attempts to restrain in ‡ation by using conventional stabilization techniques have been less than satisfactory. Three years of high unemployment and underutilized capital stock have been costly in terms both of lost production and of the denial to many of the dignity that comes from holding a productive job. Yet, despite this period of substantial slack in the economy, we still have a serious in ‡ation problem" (Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1978, p. 193) . Quoted by Romer and Romer (2004) , p. 140. 19 The situation with Miller reached the surrealistic point where, as narrated by Kettl (1986) , Charles Schultze, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors and Michael Blumenthal, the Treasury secretary, were leaking information to the press to pressure Miller to tighten monetary policy. 20 Perhaps the clearest documented moment is the meeting between Nixon and Burns on October 23, 1969, right after Burn's nomination, as narrated by John Ehrlichman (1982, pp. 248-49):
"I know there's the myth of the autonomous Fed..." Nixon barked a quick laugh. ". . . and when you go up for con…rmation some Senator may ask you about your friendship with the President. Appearances are going to be important, so you can call Ehrlichman to get messages to me, and he'll call you."
The White House continued its pressure on Burns by many di¤erent methods, from constant conversations to leaks to the press (falsely) accusing Burns of requesting a large wage increase. These, and many other histories, are collected in a fascinating article by Abrams (2006) . and that were in any case skeptical of monetary policy. 21 But his own convictions leaned in the same direction. According to the recollections of Stephen H. Axilrod, a senior sta¤ member at the Board back then, Burns did not believe any theory of the economy -whether Keynesian or monetarist-could account for the business cycle, he dismissed the relation between the stock of money and the price level, and he was unwilling or unable to make a persuasive case against in ‡ation to the nation and to the FOMC. 22 In addition, Burns had a sympathetic attitude toward price and wage controls. proposed to reintroduce mandatory price controls for large …rms. 23 In his view, controls could break the cost-push spiral of the economy and the in ‡ationary pressures triggered by the social unrest of the late 1960s and be a more e¤ective instrument than open market operations, which could be quite costly in terms of employment and …nancial disturbances. 24 In fact, many members of the FOMC believed that the introduction of price and wage controls in di¤erent phases between 1971 and 1973 had not only eased the need for monetary tightening, but it also positively suggested that monetary policy should not impose further restraint on 21 Three examples. First, Franco Modigliani testi…ed before the U.S. Congress on July 20, 1971 : "[Y]ou have to recognize that prices are presently rising, and no measure we can take short of creating massive unemployment is going to make the rate of change of prices substantially below 4 percent."
Second, Otto Eckstein, the builder of one of the large macroeconometric models at the time, the DRI U.S. model, argued that it was not the Fed's job to solve structural in ‡ation.
Third, James Tobin (1974) : "For the rest of us, the tormenting di¢ culty is that the economy shows in ‡ationary bias even when there is signi…cant involuntary unemployment. The bias is in some sense a structural defect of the economy and society .... Chronic and accelerating in ‡ation is then a symptom of a deeper social disorder, of which involuntary unemployment is an alternative symptom. Political economists may di¤er about whether it is better to face the social con ‡icts squarely or to let in ‡ation obscure them and muddle through. I can understand why anyone who prefers the …rst alternative would be working for structural reform, for a new social contract. I cannot understand why he would believe that the job can be done by monetary policy. Within limits, the Federal Reserve can shift from one symptom to the other. But it cannot cure the disease."
The examples are quoted by Hetlzel (2008), pp. 86, 89, and 128. 22 "After all, he (Burns) said, the same amount of money could support either more or less economic activity. If the economy were strong, an existing stock of money would just be turned over more rapidly, with any rise of interest rates attributable to the strength of credit demand relative to the supply. We are not overly concerned about this aspect of the data because, in our DSGE model, there is a mapping between money targeting and the Taylor rule (Woodford, 2003) . Thus, as long as we are careful to interpret the monetary policy shocks during the period (which we estimate were, indeed, larger than in other parts of the sample), our exercise should be relatively robust to this consideration. 26 A much more challenging task could be to build a DSGE model with a richer set of monetary policy rules and switches between them. However, at the moment, this goal seems infeasible. At the same time, and according to our model, Volcker was also an unlucky chairman.
The economy still su¤ered from large and negative shocks during his tenure, since the level and volatility of the intratemporal preference shifter did not fall until later in his term. In FGR, we build a counterfactual in which Volcker is faced with the same structural shocks he faced in real life, but having the historical average volatility. In this counterfactual history, in ‡ation falls to negative values by the end of 1983, instead of still hovering around 3-4 percent. It was a tough policy in a di¢ cult time. However, despite these misfortunes and heavy inheritance from the past, our model tells us that monetary policy conquered the great American in ‡ation. The great moderation would have to wait for better shocks.
We started this subsection with Burns's own words in the 1979 Per Jacobsson lecture.
In 1989, Volcker was invited to give the same lecture. What a di¤erence a decade can make! While Burns was sad and pessimistic (his lecture was entitled The Anguish of Central 167-168). 27 The impact of the credit controls imposed by the Carter administration starting on March 14, 1980 are more di¢ cult to gauge. Interestingly, we estimate a large negative innovation to the intratemporal preference shifter at that moment, a likely re ‡ection of the distortions of the controls in the intertemporal choices of households (see the historical description in Shreft, 1990). Greenspan: "seemed to fall into a pattern: The Chairman would ask for no change in the funds rate suggesting that the time was approaching for action, and indicate that there was a high probability of a move at the next meeting. Then at the next meeting, he would explain that the data did not yet provide a credible basis for tightening, and in any case the markets didn't expect a move. However, he would conclude that he expected the Committee would be forced to move at the next meeting." Meyer means these words in a positive way. In his opinion, Greenspan discovered before he did that the economy was being hit during the second half of the 1990s by an unusual sequence of positive shocks and directed monetary policy to take advantage of them.
We quote Meyer because it illustrates that Greenspan showed from the start that he knew how to respond to changing circumstances. He was appointed in August 11, 1987 . In his con…rmation hearings, he clearly rea¢ rmed the need to …ght in ‡ation. 28 But, after just a couple of months, in October 19, 1987 , he reacted to the big crash of the stock market by declaring the Fed's disposition to serve as a source of liquidity, even if, in the short run, this could complicate the control of in ‡ation.
Later, in early 1989, the federal funds rate started to fall, despite the fact that in ‡ation remained at around 6 percent until the end of 1990. As we can see in …gure 2, our estimate of ;t picks up this fall by dropping itself. Moreover, it dropped fast. We estimate that ;t was soon below 1, back to the levels of Burns-Miller (although, for a while, there is quite a bit of uncertainty in our estimate). The parameter stayed there for the rest of Greenspan's tenure.
The reason for this estimated low level of ;t is that the real interest rate also started to fall rather quickly. At the same time, a remarkable sequence of good shocks delivered rapid output growth and low in ‡ation.
In fact, in FGR we …nd that all of the shocks went right for monetary policy during the 28 He stated in his con…rmation hearings: "[W]e allowed our system to take on in ‡ationary biases which threw us into such a structural imbalance that, in order to preserve the integrity of the system, the Federal Reserve had to do what it did. Had it not acted in the way which it did at that time, the consequences would have been far worse than what subsequently happened" (U.S. Senate, 1987 We can push the argument even further. In FGR we build the counterfactual in which the average ;t during Greenspan years is plugged into the model at the time of Burns's appointment. Then, we keep ;t at that level and we hit the model with exactly the same shocks that we backed out from our estimation. This exercise is logically coherent, since we are working with a DSGE model and, therefore, the structural and volatility shocks are invariant to this class of interventions. We compute that the average monetary policy during sympathetic with the view that we've got to move and that we're going to have an extended period of moves, assuming the changes that are going on now continue in the direction of strength. It is very unlikely that the recent rate of economic growth will not simmer down largely because some developments involved in this particular period are clearly one-shot factors-namely, the very dramatic increase in residential construction and the big increase in motor vehicle sales. Essentially the two of those have added one-shot elements to growth.
In the context of a saving rate that is not high, the probability is in the direction of this expansion slowing from its recent pace, which at the moment is well over 4 percent and, adjusting for weather e¤ects, may be running over 5 percent. This is not sustainable growth, and it has nothing to do with monetary policy. In other words, it will come down. And the way a 3 percent growth feels, if I may put it that way, is a lot di¤erent from the way the expansion feels now. we're doing and there's continuity. I really request that we not do this. I do request that we be willing to move again fairly soon, and maybe in larger increments; that depends on how things are evolving."
We construe this statement as revealing a low t : We could present similar evidence regarding the behavior of policy in the aftermath of the LTCM …asco or in the exit of the 2001 recession. But we feel the point has been made. We believe that our estimates are right: monetary policy in the Greenspan years was similar to monetary policy under Burns-Miller. Instead, time-varying structural shocks were the mechanism that played a key role in the great moderation and the low in ‡ation of 1987-2007.
What Are We Missing?
What is our model missing that is really important? The answer will tell us much about where we want to go in terms of research and where we need to be careful in our reading of monetary history. Of all of the potential problems of our speci…cation, we are particularly concerned about the following.
First, households and …rms in the model observe the changes in the coe¢ cients t and yt when they occur. A more plausible scenario would involve …ltering in real time by the agents who need to learn the stand of the monetary authority from observed decisions. 29 Second, it would make the computation of the model nearly infeasible.
Second, we assume that monetary policy changes are independent of the events in the economy. However, many channels make this assumption untenable. For instance, each administration searches for governors of the Board who conform with its views on the economy (after all, this is what a democracy is supposed to be about). We saw how Heller discovered that an administration could select governors to twist the FOMC toward its policy priorities.
This is a tradition that has continued. Meyer (2004, p. 17) describes the process for his own appointment as one clearly guided by the desire of the Clinton administration to "make monetary policy more accommodative and growth oriented."As long as the party in power is a function of the state of the economy, the composition of the FOMC will clearly be endogenous.
Similarly, changes in public perception of the dangers of in ‡ation certainly weighed heavily on Carter when he appointed Volcker to lead the Fed in 1979.
Third, and a related issue to our two previous points, evolving beliefs about monetary policy might be endogenous to the developments of events and lead to self-con…rming equilibria.
This is a point emphasized by Cho, Williams, and and Sargent (2008) . 
Concluding Remarks
The title of this paper is not only a tribute to Friedman and Schwartz's (1971) opus magnum, but also a statement of the limitations of our investigation. Neither the space allocated to us shocks. When we go to the historical record and use the results of our estimation to read and assess the documentary evidence, we …nd ample con…rmation, in our opinion, that the model, despite all its limitations, is teaching us important lessons.
As we argued in the previous section, we leave much unsaid. Hopefully, the results in this paper will be enticing enough for other researchers to continue a close exploration of recent monetary policy history with the tools of modern dynamic macroeconomics.
